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Planning For Same-Sex Couples In 2011
Patricia A. Cain

Patricia A. Cain

is the Inez Mabie Distinguished Professor of Law
at Santa Clara University and the Aliber Family
Chair in Law, Emeritus, at the University of Iowa.
She is the author of Rainbow Rights: The Role of
Lawyers and Courts in the Lesbian and Gay Civil
Rights Movement (Westview Press 2000) and
Sexuality Law, 2nd Edition (Carolina Academic
Press 2009) (with Arthur S. Leonard). She teaches
courses in federal taxation, property, wills and
trusts, and sexuality and the law. She began her
career as a law professor in 1974 at the University
of Texas and has taught as a visitor at a number of
law schools, including the University of Wisconsin,
Tulane, the University of Southern California,
the University of San Francisco, McGeorge, and
Washington University in St. Louis. Most of her
recent scholarship focuses on tax planning for
same-sex couples. She is a member of the ALI
and an ACTEC Fellow. (IRS Circular 230 Notice:
This outline is intended for educational purposes
only. It is not intended as tax advice. To the extent
that this document concerns tax matters, it is not
intended to be used and cannot be used by a
taxpayer for the purpose of avoiding penalties
that may be imposed by law.) © Patricia A. Cain

A.	Overview Of Recognition Versus Non-Recognition
States
1.	
States That Recognize Same-Sex Marriage. Five states and
the District of Columbia currently recognize same-sex
marriages celebrated within their borders. California
recognizes some same-sex marriages celebrated within
its borders.
a.	Massachusetts—see Goodridge v. Department of Public
Health, 798 N.E.2d 941 (Mass. 2003)
b.	Connecticut—Kerrigan v. Comm’r of Public Health,
957 A.2d 407 (Conn. 2008).
c. Iowa—Varnum v. Brien, 763 N.W.2d 862 (Iowa
2009).
d. New Hampshire—by statute.
e. Vermont—by statute.
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f. District of Columbia—by statute.
g.	California—Approximately 18,000 same-sex couples were married in California between June 16,
2008, and midnight of November 4, 2008 (the date of the general election that passed Proposition
8 stating that “Only marriage between a man and a woman is valid or recognized in California.”).
California has also passed a statute, S.B. 54, that recognizes all valid marriages from other states
post-November 4, 2008, as entitled to the same rights, privileges, and responsibilities of marriage,
but not the name “marriage.”
2.

States That Recognize Valid Foreign Same-Sex Marriages
a.	New York—Valid foreign marriages are recognized for most purposes, although not for state income tax purposes. There is no direct authority that covers recognition for state estate tax purposes.
b.	New Jersey—Marriages have been recognized for purposes of divorce, but not for other purposes.
c.	Maryland—The Attorney General issued an opinion in 2010 that valid out-of-state same-sex marriages should be recognized under Maryland law.
d.	 New Mexico—The Attorney General issued a recent opinion that New Mexico would recognize
valid out-of-state same-sex marriages.
e.	California—California recognizes valid out-of-state same-sex marriages that pre-date Proposition
8, November 4 (midnight), 2008.

3.

States That Recognize Spousal Equivalency
a. New Jersey—civil unions.
b. California—registered domestic partnerships (includes rights to community property).
c. Oregon—domestic partnerships.
d. Washington—domestic partnerships (includes community property).
e. Nevada—domestic partnerships (includes community property).
f. Illinois—civil unions (effective June 1, 2011).
g. Hawaii—civil unions (effective January 1, 2012).

4.

States That Recognize Status, But Only Provide A Handful Of Rights And Obligations
Electronic copy available at: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1860217
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Hawaii

Reciprocal
Beneficiaries

Couples must opt
for either civil
union or reciprocal
beneficiary
Maine
Maryland
District of
Columbia

Created by legislature in 1997 in response to marriage case
litigation
Available for any two people who cannot marry and not
just same-sex couples (for example, sisters can register)
Limited rights, but does include inheritance and ability to
own property as tenants by the entirety

Domestic
Partnerships

Limited rights

Domestic
Partnerships

Limited rights (medical and taxation)

Domestic
Partnerships

First enacted in 1992, but not funded

Enacted in 2004
Enacted in 2008 (effective 7/1/2008)
2002—health benefits for government employees enacted
Additional medical, inheritance, and similar rights have
been added, most recently in 2008, bringing the status
closer to full parity with marriage
Status is retained even though DC now recognizes
marriages

Colorado

Designated
Beneficiary

Creates a central registry where a person can indicate a
beneficiary (including different beneficiaries) for various
types of rights

Wisconsin

Domestic
Partnerships

Limited rights

5.	
State Constitutional Amendments Banning Same-Sex Marriage. Many states have adopted constitutional
amendments regarding same-sex marriage. Some of these amendments (such as California’s) ban only
same-sex marriage; others (such as Georgia’s) ban any sort of relations between same-sex couples.
a.	Hawaii was the first state to adopt a constitutional amendment. It was adopted in the midst of the
state litigation over the right to marry. The amendment does not ban same-sex marriage. Rather,
it leaves the definition up to the legislature.
b. The chart below indicates how many states are restricted by constitutional amendments.
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States that do not currently
recognize marriage and are free to
adopt marriage by legislative act
(no constitution prohibition)

States that have
constitutional amendments
prohibiting marriage
equality

States that have constitutional
amendments prohibiting any
recognition (for example,
prohibiting RDPs and civil unions
as well as marriage)

Delaware

Alaska

Alabama

Hawaii*

Arizona

Arkansas

Illinois

California

Florida

Indiana

Colorado

Georgia

Maine

Mississippi

Idaho

Maryland

Missouri

Kansas

Minnesota

Montana

Kentucky

New Jersey

Nevada

Louisiana

New Mexico

Oregon

Michigan

New York

Tennessee

Nebraska

North Carolina

North Dakota

Pennsylvania

Ohio

Rhode Island

Oklahoma

Washington

South Carolina

West Virginia

South Dakota

Wyoming

Texas
Utah

*Hawaii has a constitutional provision

Virginia

but it does not ban marriage. It says that

Wisconsin

the legislature shall define marriage.

B. Overview Of Types Of Problems That Arise Under Existing Law
1.	
Non-Recognition States. Most states do not recognize the status of same-sex couples no matter how committed they are. As a result, tax law treats such partners as strangers. This is not a true reflection of
the reality of their lives. Applying tax rules that do not recognize the reality of the couple’s property
sharing and support for each creates both benefits and detriments. (For example, a two-earner couple,
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filing as single or as single and head of household, avoids the marriage tax penalty, but is burdened by
the estate and gift tax rules.)
2.	
DOMA. Under the Defense of Marriage Act, none of the Internal Revenue Code provisions that specifically reference “spouses” or “marriage” can be applied to same-sex couples. That puts all same-sex
couples, even those recognized as married, in a disfavored position with respect to the following issues:
a. No Marital Deduction For Gift Tax Purposes
		i.
When one partner supports the other, the support may constitute a taxable gift, unless it qualifies as medical or educational payments under Internal Revenue Code §2503(e). (Unless otherwise
indicated, all section references are to the Code.) Payment of support in states where the couple’s
status is recognized under state law and where state law imposes an obligation of support should
not be treated as taxable gifts. This difference in tax treatment depending on state family law creates geographical inequities and bad tax policy.
		ii.
Partners often acquire the principal residence together and do not always contribute equally
to the purchase price. To the extent that one partner contributes more than $26,000 of separate
funds to the cost of a jointly owned residence (50/50 ownership), that partner is making a taxable
gift. The gift tax can be avoided by careful planning and by drafting documents that make ownership in the jointly owned property proportionate to contributions. The need for extra legal work,
however, imposes a burden on such couples. And, often, couples are not advised of the gift tax issues at the time of purchase or of adding a partner to the title.
b. No Marital Deduction For Estate Tax Purposes
		i.
Spouses can accumulate property jointly during their relationship without fear that upon an
untimely death of the first spouse, the second spouse will have to liquidate some of their estate
holdings to pay an estate tax. As a result of the unlimited marital deduction, the combined estate
is not taxed until the death of the second spouse, thereby creating something like a tax on wealth
when it passes to the next generation. For same-sex couples, a tax will be levied at the death of the
first partner to the extent that partner’s share of the estate exceeds the exemption amount ($5 million as of 2011).
		ii. With proper estate planning, a same-sex couple can utilize bypass trusts to avoid a second
estate tax at the death of the second partner. In such cases, the tax on the couple will similarly be
levied only once at their generation.
		iii. However, unlike with spouses, the tax will be levied at the death of the first to die, rather than
at the death of the second to die. Although the $5 million exemption makes this a limited problem
for other than the very wealthy, consider a wealthy same-sex married couple whose principal residence is the main asset and is valued at more than $10 million. Even after the exemption, the tax
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due on the home alone will be 35 percent of $5 million, or $1,750,000. That may seem a high price
to pay to stay in the family home.
c. Section 1041 Only Applies To Spouses And Ex-Spouses
		i.
Section 1041 makes transfers incident to divorce non-taxable for spouses. But under DOMA,
this section will not apply to same-sex spouses or similar couples. As a result, couples will be subjected to the same income tax rules that faced spouses before the passage of section 1041. If the
pre-1041 rules are applied consistently, same-sex couples in community property states may be
able to split their community estate free of income tax and gift tax (discussed in more detail below).
Tax-free divisions may also be available for couples in non-community property states as long as
their property divisions are basically equal divisions of property that was jointly owned during the
relationship. But for couples in which one partner was the breadwinner and the other stayed home
to take care of the children, a taxable event is likely in non-community property states (discussed
in more detail below). Again, this creates a geographical inequity that seems inconsistent with a
uniform tax rule throughout the country.
d. Sections 71 And 215 (Alimony And Child Support) Only Apply To Spouses
		i.
The first statutory provisions regarding taxation of support payments made incident to divorce were enacted in the 1940s. They have evolved over time into the current versions of sections 71 and 215. But these statutes, by their terms, only apply to spouses and ex-spouses. Under
DOMA, they cannot apply to same-sex couples, even those who are married and getting a divorce
under state law. For couples who are divorcing in states where their relationships are recognized,
there is a strong argument that the payment of alimony has no tax effect on either party. That is, it
should not be taxable to the recipient or deductible by the payor. That is the rule that was in effect
before the statutory changes in the 1940s. See Gould v. Gould, 245 U.S. 151 (1917), discussed in D.1.b
below.
		ii. No independent rules outside of section 71 deal with taxation of child support, although everyone assumes that such payments are not income if paid to the custodial parent. The principal
in Gould supports this result for state-imposed obligations of support. But in non-recognition states,
where the paying partner is not recognized as a legal parent, the transfer could either be considered income to the party who receives it or a gift under section 102. In the worst possible world,
such payments could be considered income to the recipient and a possible taxable gift by the payor.
(Note: The test for what is a gift under the income tax is different from the test for what is a gift
under the gift tax. See Part D below.)
3. 	Other IRC Issues. Another set of problems arises because the Internal Revenue Code has been amended
over time to deal with issues faced by married couples. No amendments have been made to take
into account the existence of unmarried same-sex couples who have virtually the same rights and
responsibilities as spouses. In addition to those who are married, but not recognized as such because
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of DOMA, such couples include registered domestic partners (RDPs) in California, Oregon, Washington, Nevada, Hawaii, and Illinois who have basically the same rights and obligations as spouses,
and parties to a civil union in New Jersey and Illinois, who similarly are spousal equivalents. A number
of other states recognize registered couples, but provide them with only a handful of rights and obligations (for example, Maryland, Maine, Wisconsin, Colorado, and the District of Columbia, where
same-sex couples can also opt for marriage, and Hawaii, where same-sex couples can opt for either
civil unions or reciprocal beneficiary status). The Code and the interpretive regulations and rulings
of the IRS simply do not address a number of the issues that are raised by these state-recognition-ofstatus laws. Here are some examples:
a.	Section 2040 provides a special rule (discussed in C.1.b.iii below) for estate inclusion of property
held as “joint tenancy with right of survivorship by the decedent and any other person, or as tenants by the entirety by the decedent and spouse.” Does this rule apply to property held as “community property with right of survivorship”? Does it apply to property held as tenants by the entirety
with a non-spouse?
b.	Spousal gifting that created a tenancy by the entirety (TBE) used to be covered by section 2515,
but that section has been repealed. This leaves no guidance for how to value a TBE interest that is
gifted in states where unmarried couples (or same-sex spouses) can create TBE interests. Because
TBE properties are not unilaterally severable, the valuation formula is different from that applied
to joint tenancy with right of survivorship.
c.	The IRS has recently recognized that the community income of RDPs in California is owned
50/50, and under the principles of Poe v. Seaborn, 282 U.S. 101 (1930) (discussed in C.1.d below),
each partner (or spouse) is required to report 50 percent of any such income. Decades ago, we
learned of a problem that arose for certain community property spouses who filed separate returns (married filing separately) and failed to report the required 50 percent of income earned or
acquired by the other spouse. Had these spouses filed jointly, they would have been able to satisfy
the statutory provisions for innocent spouse and been relieved of the liability for tax on income
that they neither knew about nor benefitted from. But, having filed separately, this innocent spouse
provision was not available to them. Nor was the United States Supreme Court willing to cease
applying the basic principle of Poe v. Seaborn in such cases. See United States v. Mitchell, 403 U.S. 190
(1971). Thus, Ms. Mitchell was liable for taxes on 50 percent of the community income that her
husband had hidden from her. Congress responded by enacting section 66 to provide relief similar
to the innocent spouse provisions to persons in the position that Ms. Mitchell found herself in. That
statute, however, only applies to spouses. As a result, an innocent RDP (or same-sex spouse) might
be in the same position as Ms. Mitchell.
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C. Acquisition And Ownership Of Property During The Relationship
1.	
Title To Property. If a couple wants to own real estate jointly, there are a number of different ways to
accomplish that. Each of the forms of ownership listed below creates its own unique tax issues. Many
of these issues apply to ownership of personalty as well as realty. Joint bank accounts, however, have
their own rules and thus do not generally raise any of the gift tax or similar issues discussed below.
For gift tax purposes, joint bank accounts are treated as revocable gifts. Thus, creating a joint account
does not result in a completed gift for gift tax purposes. But if one partner withdraws more than that
partner contributed, there may be a completed gift at that time. It depends on the intent of the parties
and the state law rights in the depositor to demand his or her money back. In any event, keeping track
of these transfers is in many situations virtually impossible.
a.	
Tenancy In Common. In a tenancy in common, the partners (or spouses) each own an undivided interest in the whole. They can own these interests in any proportion. Often couples wish to own property in proportion to their contributions to the purchase price. If they do this, no taxable gift occurs
upon formation of the tenancy in common. If one person is already the owner and wishes to sell
an undivided interest to his or her partner, there may be taxable gain. If the sale is of a principal
residence that qualifies under section 121 for nonrecognition of gain, up to $250,000 of gain can
be excluded. Note, however, that this is a single exclusion of $250,000 for this seller on this residence. If $100,000 of the gain is excluded, upon a later sale the original owner can exclude only
an additional $150,000. The partner who buys in, however, will still have a $250,000 maximum
exclusion amount on this residence. Other tax points:
		i.
If the sale is of property other than a principal residence, the gain may be deferred if the
sale is structured as an installment sale. Interest should be stated on the installment note to avoid
imputed interest and the section 7872 rules.
		ii. If one partner gifts an undivided interest to the other partner, the transaction is a taxable gift.
(Note: The IRS is reviewing deed records in California to identify transfers that look like they may
be unreported taxable gifts.)
		iii. The value of the gift should be reduced by a fractional share discount—for example, a 50
percent interest in Blackacre is worth less than 50 percent of the full market value of Blackacre
because it is difficult to market undivided interests in property. See, e.g., LeFrak v. Comm’r, 1993 WL
470956 (U.S. Tax Ct. Nov. 16, 1993) (20 percent discount); Ludwick v. Comm’r, 2010 WL 1850223
(U.S. Tax Ct. May 10, 2010)(30 percent discount rejected; approximately 15 percent deemed reasonable under facts; good discussion of method of determining discount).
		iv. If a gift tax return is filed, the statute of limitations should begin as long as there is a sufficiently thorough appraisal.
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		v. Gifts Spread Over Several Years. Some transferors split gifts of land into fractional shares that will
qualify for the $13,000 per year annual exclusion. In planning for these annual gifts, it would be
good to make the first two transfers in December and January so that you can rely on the same appraisal. It is still advisable to get a statement from the appraiser that nothing has changed to affect
the value during the one- or two-week period between the two transfers, but you will not have to
pay for two full appraisals in this case.
		vi. Upon the death of the first partner, the estate will include the undivided interest owned by the
decedent. But again, a fractional share discount ought to be allowed.
		vii. If the co-tenants additionally restrict the marketability of the property by agreeing to waive
their right to partition while either of them is alive, it may be possible to obtain additional discounts
for lack of marketability. There is a valid non-tax reason for entering into such agreements, especially if the property in question is the principal residence and each partner wants assurance that
the property will not be sold without consent during his or her life.
		viii. For transfer tax purposes, the valuation of the transferred property is not based on what the
transferor owned or what the transferee receives. Instead, it is based on the property itself, while in
transit, and the test is what a willing buyer would pay on the open market. See Shepherd v. Comm’r,
283 F.3d 1258, 1262 (11th Cir. 2002), which explains the issue as follows:
		
This “in transit” valuation has been described as analyzing “the moment of truth, when the ownership of the [donor]
ends and the ownership of the [donees] begins.” United States v. Land, 303 F.2d 170, 172 (5th Cir.1962). “Brief as is the
instant [of transfer], the court must pinpoint its valuation at this instant.” Id. See also Estate of Bright v. United States, 658
F.2d 999, 1002 (5th Cir.1981) (en banc) (noting valuation for estate tax purposes “to be made at the time of the transfer”).

b.	
Joint Tenancy With Right of Survivorship (JTWROS). As with co-tenancies, if the partners hold interests in the joint tenancy that are equal to their contributions, there is no gift upon formation of
the JTWROS. Because some states still follow the common law rule, based on the doctrine of the
four unities (time, title, possession, and interest), joint tenants may be required to own the property
50/50 (unity of interest). There is also some risk that any side agreement that says otherwise might
be viewed as a severance of the joint tenancy, although the modern rule would require an intent to
sever.
		i.

The Unequal Contribution/Unequal Ownership Problem

			

(1) Some states still follow the common law rule.

			(2) Some states—California, for example—require “equal shares” or “equal interests” by
statute. See Cal. Civ. Code §683; N. M. Stat. Ann. §47-1-36; Utah Code Ann. §57-1-5.
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			(3) The modern trend is toward rejecting the “four unities” as a fixed requirement and instead relying more strongly on intent of the parties. See In re Estate of Johnson, 739 N.W.2d
493 (Iowa 2007); R.H. Helmholz, Realism & Formalism in the Severance of Joint Tenancies, 77 Neb.
L. Rev. 1 (1998). Although the issue more often arises in the context of whether there is an
unintentional unilateral severance, the Iowa Court quite clearly stated “we see no reason to
distinguish our [intent-based] approach based on whether the joint tenancy is sought to be
created, severed, or terminated.” Johnson, supra, 739 N.W.2d at 497–498.
			(4) Despite this modern trend, I would not state in the deed that the joint tenancy is held
other than 50/50. Instead, I would draft a side agreement between the parties that does the
following: (1) reaffirms the intent to hold the property as joint tenants; (2) provides that if the
tenancy is severed into a tenancy in common the shares will be in accord with contributions;
and (3) provides that if the joint tenancy is sold while the two joint tenants are alive, the sale
shall be deemed a severance and the proceeds from the sale shall be distributed in accord with
contributions.
		ii. Gift Tax Upon Formation. If the interests are not taken in accord with contributions (for example,
if there is no side agreement to account for unequal contributions), the creation of the joint tenancy will be treated as a transfer subject to the gift tax. Because of the unilateral right to sever, each
joint tenant is considered vested with a 50 percent undivided interest. To the extent that one tenant
did not contribute 50 percent of the purchase price, the other tenant will be deemed to have made
a gift.
			(1) The gift should be valued with a fractional share discount. If the transfer creates a taxable
gift, a valuation expert should be consulted to help set the value of the gifted portion. As with
gifts of tenancy in common interests, the same considerations apply regarding splitting the gift
over several years and providing annual appraisals.
		iii. Estate Tax At Death. One huge problem with JTWROS is the rule under section 2040 that 100
percent of the fair market value of the property will be included in the estate of the first to die unless the surviving joint tenant can prove original contribution to the acquisition of the property.
			(1) No Fractional Share Discount. Because section 2040 is a special rule requiring full inclusion
of the property’s value in the estate, arguments regarding fractional interest discounts are
inapplicable. Compare Estate of Williams v. Comm’r, 75 T.C.M. (CCH) 1758 (1998) (allowing
a fractional discount in valuing, for estate tax purposes, an undivided half interest held as
tenants in common) with Estate of Young v. Comm’r, 110 T.C. 297 (1998) (no fractional discount
allowed for joint tenancy property included in estate under section 2040). Thus, even if the
survivor can prove 50 percent contribution, the property will be valued for estate tax purposes
at a higher value than if it had been held by the owners as tenants in common.
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(2) Contribution Of Survivor Must Originate With Survivor. What if Partner A had given Partner
B cash and B had used the cash to purchase her part of the home? If B can prove her contribution to the purchase price, can she reduce the amount of the value included in A’s estate
under section 2040? The answer is no, because B must not only prove her contribution, but
must also prove that the contribution came from her and is not traceable to a gift of cash from
A. See Goldsborough v. Comm’r, 70 T.C. 1077 (1978), aff ’d per curiam, 49 A.F.T.R.2d (RIA) 1469
(4th Cir. 1982) (mother transferred land outright to daughters; years later they sold land and
invested proceeds in stock held jointly with mother; at mother’s death, IRS argued that full
value of jointly owned stock was subject to estate tax because the daughters’ contribution
could be traced to the original gift from mother; Tax Court held that the portion of the value
of the jointly owned stock traceable to the original gift of land from mother to daughters was
included in mother’s estate, but not the portion traceable to the capital gain on the land that
accrued while the daughters held the property in their own names).
			(3) Adequate Records. What sort of evidence can be offered to overcome the presumption that
the first to die contributed everything? The regulations don’t say and there are very few cases.
Assume that A and B made equal contributions to the purchase of the home. Even if they
have accurate records of who contributed how much to the down payment, they will still need
to show equal contribution to the mortgage payments. However, exact records on individual
contributions may not be necessary. Proof that each owner had sufficient funds available to
contribute equally and reliance on the Cohan rule—Cohan v. Comm’r of Internal Revenue, 39 F.2d
540 (2nd Cir. 1930) (estimation of expenses okay for deduction purposes)—should suffice. See
Estate of Fratini v. Comm’r, 1998 WL 525500 (U.S. Tax Ct. Aug 24, 1998). See also Concordia v.
Comm’r, 2002 WL 1964737 (U.S. Tax Ct. Aug. 26, 2002) (commissioner challenged allegation
of contribution by survivor, but court ruled in favor of survivor on the basis of survivor’s testimony, which was corroborated and uncontradicted).
			(4) Additional Evidence. As additional protection against the application of section 2040, I suggest that both joint tenants sign an affidavit explaining how the full purchase price of the
property is being paid equally by both of them. The section 2040 presumption is rebuttable
and once any evidence is submitted by the survivor, the burden will shift to the IRS to prove
otherwise. I have talked to IRS personnel about this and they state that they will not rely on
any such affidavits, but instead will seek records. That is understandable. The affidavit is not
intended to replace records, only to supplement available records that may be incomplete.
			(5) Risk Of Audit. A 1999 survey of IRS estate tax attorney auditors listed non-spousal joint
tenancies high on the list of possible hot topics subject to audit. Because of this viewpoint, it is
probably wise to attach to the estate tax return some evidence of equal contribution. It might
help avoid an audit.
c.	
Tenancy By The Entirety (TBE) (Massachusetts, Hawaii, Oregon, Vermont, Illinois). Tenancy by the
entirety is a common law form of joint ownership limited to spouses. It usually is available only for
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realty. Hawaii, Oregon, and Illinois all authorize this form of ownership for registered partners. In
Massachusetts and Vermont, same-sex spouses can own property on the same basis as opposite-sex
spouses. The attributes of a tenancy by the entirety are the same as a joint tenancy with right of
survivorship except that there is no unilateral severance. Key points:
		i.
Since the TBE cannot be unilaterally severed, it enjoys a certain amount of protection from
creditors. In Hawaii and Vermont, for example, property held as tenants by the entirety is basically
exempt from creditors’ claims. In Hawaii, even if spouses (or reciprocal beneficiaries) convey the
property away to a third party, their creditors cannot reach the property. See Sawada v. Endo, 561
P.2d 1291 (Haw. 1977). Creditors can attach entireties property in Massachusetts and Oregon, but
they cannot destroy the nondebtor spouse’s survival rights. If the nondebtor spouse survives, the
creditor takes nothing.
		ii. Computing the value of the gift for gift tax purposes is complicated by the fact that there is no
unilateral severance for estates held as TBE. A JTWROS is valued on the basis of two equal 50 percent undivided interests (the same as a tenancy in common) because unilateral severance empowers
each tenant to convert the JTWROS into a tenancy in common. When a TBE is created, however,
the value of each tenant is the sum of two different interests in the property: (1) the value of the
joint life estate, and (2) the value of the contingent remainder. If the tenants’ ages are far apart, the
value of the two interests will vary more greatly. Valuation of TBE gifts used to be covered by the
regulations under section 2515 (covering gift tax rules for the creation of tenancies by the entirety
between spouses). But section 2515 has been repealed now that there is a 100 percent marital deduction. One might assume that the valuation rules in these regulations would nonetheless apply
to the creation of nonmarital tenancies by the entireties. However, there is no statute or regulation
directly on point, probably because the Treasury and IRS have never acknowledged that same-sex
couples can hold property as tenants by the entirety. If claiming that tenants’ interests should be
treated as though they were equal in value, one might cite to the fact that the disclaimer regulations
were amended in 1997 to treat a TBE as passing a 50 percent interest in the property at the death
of the first spouse. See Treas. Reg. §25.2518-2(c)(4).
		iii. See also Treas. Reg. §25.2515-2, which is still on the books and gives example of how to value
such gifted interests.
		

iv.

But valuation depended on life expectancy “factors” in Treas. Reg. §25.2515-5 (now repealed).

		

v.

Presumably, one would consult joint life actuarial tables to compute.

		vi. Existing caselaw on valuation of the interest for purposes other than gift tax (for example,
amount of property subject to tax lien) are in conflict. See Pletz v. U.S., 221 F.3d 1114 (9th Cir. 2000)
(joint life actuarial tables used); U.S. v. Goddard, 735 F. Supp. 2d 820 (E.D. Tenn. 2010) (50 percent
of fair market value used).
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		vii. Estate taxation of tenancies by the entireties is probably covered by section 2040, although it
is worth noting that the statutory language in section 2040 refers only to “tenants by the entirety
by the decedent and spouse” (emphasis added). If DOMA continues to prevent spousal recognition for
same-sex couples in other Code provisions, it is arguable that it should prevent section 2040 from
applying to same-sex tenants by the entirety. It is probably worth noting that the IRS has tended to
take a literal approach toward DOMA, taking the position that any statute with the word “spouse”
in it cannot apply to same-sex couples. [See, for example, instructions in IRS Publication 555 dealing with community property issues and pointing out the instances in which statutory rules that
mention spouse are simply not available for Registered Domestic Partners or same-sex spouses.]
In the case of section 2040, however, it would be in the interest of the federal fisc to include all
same-sex couples who hold property as tenants by the entirety. I support construing any statute
that describes rules based on spousal property rights as rules that should be applied to all couples
who have the same property rights, but it is not clear that the IRS would adopt that position in any
case, and thus it is reasonable to argue that section 2040 does not apply to same sex couples who
hold a tenancy by the entirety. If section 2040 does not apply, one might argue that there is nothing included in the estate because at the moment of death, the decedent does not own anything. I
don’t think this is a more-likely-than-not outcome, however.
		viii. If section 2040 does apply, all the points made previously with respect to JTWROS property
are applicable.
d.	Community Property. Same-sex (and opposite-sex) registered domestic partners in California, Washington, and Nevada can hold property as community property on the same basis as spouses. In
California and Nevada, property may also be held as community property with right of survivorship. In Washington, spouses or registered partners who own property as JTWROS are presumed
to own the property as community property, except that the survivorship feature of joint tenancy is
retained. See Wash. Rev. Code Ann. §64.28.040. This is a roundabout way of creating community
property with right of survivorship. As long as the property is classified as community property
under state law (even if title is held as JTWROS), the IRS will treat the property as community
property. See Rev. Rul. 87-98, 1987-2 C.B. 206.
		i.
Generally, for tax purposes, when community property is acquired during the marriage
through the efforts of one of the spouses, the property is viewed as initially vested 50 percent in
each spouse. The tax consequences that flow from this analysis assume that there is no transfer
from one spouse to the other, even though all of the community income may be earned by that
one spouse. See Poe v. Seaborn, 282 U.S. 101 (1930) (Washington community property law); United
States v. Malcolm, 282 U.S. 792 (1931) (Seaborn rule extended to California community property).
Additionally, since all community income is vested equally in the spouses the moment it comes into
existence, Poe v. Seaborn, rather than Lucas v. Earl, 281 U.S. 111 (1930), applies to impose income tax
liability on each spouse or partner for half of the community income.
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		ii. Several tax scholars, including this author, argued that the Seaborn rule should have applied to
California RDPs as of January 1, 2005, the first instance in which the community property rules of
any state were extended to RDPs. See Cain, Relitigating Seaborn, Taxing the Community Income of California Registered Domestic Partners, 111 Tax Notes 561 (2006). Initially, the IRS disagreed. See CCA
200608038, holding that earned community income from personal services must be taxed to the
earner.
		iii. The IRS has now reversed course. See CCA 201021050 and PLR 201021048, holding that
all community income should be split 50/50 for income tax reporting and that the creation of
community property, even if attributable to the earnings of one partner, is not a transfer for gift tax
purposes. The 2010 CCA, however, takes the position that the original position stated in the 2006
CCA was correct at the time and that the law changed in 2007 because that was the first year that
California authorized RDPs to report 50 percent of personal service community income as belonging to each partner for state income tax purposes.
		iv. Critique Of IRS Position On The 2007 Effective Date For Applying Seaborn: The community property
regime was extended fully to RDPs as of January 1, 2005. That is the same date that RDPs began
to be treated as spousal equivalents for most additional state law purposes. But for state income tax
purposes, there were two special rules applicable in 2005 that were later repealed as of 2007. First,
RDPs were not allowed to file joint returns. They were required to file state tax returns on the same
basis as federal tax returns, which necessarily required them to file as single. Furthermore, worried
that two couples filing singly and splitting all community income might pay a lower tax bill, a provision was included in AB 205 (the Domestic Partner Act) that provided that “[e]arned income may
not be treated as community property for state income tax purposes.” Cal. Fam. Code §297.5(g)—
repealed as of 2007. The California legislature did not say that wages were not community or did
not belong equally to both RDPs. All it said was that even though this is community property, you
cannot treat it as community and thus split it for purposes of state income tax law. This approach
is not unlike federal legislative enactments that reverse the rule of Seaborn in limited circumstances,
such as section 66 (innocent spouse) and section 879(a) (nonresident aliens). But without any limitation for federal income tax rules, the property law rule of the state should be the rule that allocates
the income—and as of 2005, that rule in California allocated community income of RDPs 50/50
for all purposes other than state income tax law.
		v. The IRS reluctance to recognize the full strength of the community property interests and
the application of Seaborn to all such state-created property rights raises transfer tax issues for community property that can be traced to unequal earnings before 2007. Even if the IRS wishes to
stick with the 2007 start date for income tax purposes, it would be helpful to clarify the transfer tax
issues with respect to pre-2007 community property.
		vi. There are many unanswered questions about how RDPs are supposed to comply with the new
reporting requirements under the 2010 CCA. Tax return preparers are worried about unjustified
audits because they are forced to report on single returns, which provide no indication or special
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lines for splitting community income. In addition, although withholding taxes are to be allocated
50/50 on the final return, the IRS (unofficial) position to date is that estimated payments, even
if made out of community funds, can only be allocated to the person whose earnings produced
the estimated tax liability. Unless changes are made, it is unlikely that RDPs in these three states
(California, Washington, and Nevada) will be able to e-file. The IRS is proposing some changes,
planned to take effect in mid-February 2011. These changes would make it possible to e-file, and
to receive any refunds due, but many such returns are likely to be caught by automatic computer
audits that are run toward the end of 2011. This is because there is no e-file box to check to show
the other partner’s Social Security Number, and splitting withholding on vastly different income
levels is likely to trigger a computer-generated inquiry about the return. As a result, many professional return preparers are not planning to e-file this season for their community property RDPs.
		

vii. Unanswered questions for planners (as opposed to return preparers) include the following:

			(1) Estate Tax Consequences. Neither the PLR nor the CCA addresses any estate tax issues.
Presumably, if there is no gift tax upon formation, at death the community estate will be split
50/50, and thus only half will be included in the estate of the first to die.
			(2) Although there will be a double step-up in basis for California income tax purposes, that
rule cannot be applied at the federal level. It is a matter of statutory law and the statute uses
the word “spouse.” As long as DOMA is on the books, section 1014 is probably not available
for same-sex spouses. There is an argument that the “word” spouse in the statute is descriptive, not normative, and thus the provision should apply to any couple subject to a state community property regime, but it seems unlikely that the IRS will adopt this approach to statutory construction. Washington and Nevada do not have a state income tax, so the benefit of
the stepped-up basis under state law is currently only available in California.
			(3) Will community property with right of survivorship be covered by section 2040 even
though it is not specifically mentioned in that provision? On the one hand, the survivorship
feature suggests a similarity to JTWROS (and thus section 2040 ought to apply), but on the
other hand, since this is community property, by definition it already belongs to both partners
and there should be no reason to require proof of original contribution (and thus section 2040
ought not to apply). Different considerations, however, might apply to property that has been
transmuted from separate to community.
			(4) In community property states, spouses and RDPs can agree to change the character of
their property. To be effective, these agreements must follow the requirements of state statutes. Transmuting property from one type to another can create taxable gifts. Although there
is some old law on these issues involving husbands and wives, there is nothing very recent
because the 100 percent marital deduction enacted in 1981 made this question irrelevant for
opposite-sex spouses.
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				(A) Agreements entered into before registration can convert property to be acquired
in the future from community to separate. Such agreements do not constitute a current
transfer of property and do not create taxable gifts at the time they are signed, but query
whether they create taxable gifts at the time the conversion occurs.
				(B) Agreements that future earnings will be treated as separate rather than community have been recognized for income tax purposes to tax only the earner. See Van Dyke v.
Comm’r, 120 F.2d 945 (9th Cir. 1941).
				(C) What will the gift tax effect of such agreements be? For example, in the year that
A’s $100K salary, which but for the agreement with RDP B would have been community,
vests in A as separate property, has B made a gift of $50K to A? I can find no authority,
but to be consistent with the reasoning in the Van Dyke case, supra, there should be no taxable gift. Under state law, the agreement has successfully converted community property
into separate ab initio, and so it belongs to A the moment it comes into existence as income
and there is no transfer from B to A.
				(D) Agreements that future separate income from separate property will be community
will create a taxable gift at the time the income arises and the income will be taxed to the
owner of the separate property. This fact situation raises a typical assignment of income
issue—an attempt to assign income from the property without transferring the underlying
income-producing property. As a result, the income still belongs to the separate owner
for income tax purposes and the transfer by agreement is a gift. See Rev. Rul. 77-359,
1977-2 C.B. 24. See also PLR 8109032 (under a 1980 Louisiana statute, royalty income
on separate mineral interest was classified as separate property; the law allowed spouses
to agree to continue treating such income as community property, as it had been treated
under pre-1980 law; IRS ruled that any such agreement would be a transmutation from
separate to community and thus would create a taxable gift). The gift is complete when
the agreement is signed. However, no gift tax is incurred until the value of the gift can be
ascertained, that is, at the time the royalty income is earned. See Rev. Rul. 69-346, 1969-1
C.B. 227.
				(E) Transmutation of community property to separate property after registration would
not create a taxable gift if the property were divided equally between the two partners.
They would merely be receiving what they already owned albeit free of the community
regime. See Comm’r v. Mills, 183 F.2d 32 (9th Cir. 1950). But a transmutation of community
property into the separate property of one partner should be treated as a taxable gift since
it serves to transfer a 50 percent interest of one partner to the other. See Rev. Rul. 75-551,
1975-2 C.B. 378 (ruling that equal divisions are not taxable and implying that unequal
divisions would be).
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				(F) Transmutation of separate property of one partner into community property after
registration can create a taxable gift. Such an agreement would “transfer” vested property rights from one partner to the other. See Damner v. Comm’r, 3 T.C. 638 (1944).
				(G) Applying these general principles, there should be no gift tax consequences if partners convert a JTWROS or tenancy in common into community property, provided that
the joint tenancy or tenancy in common was owned 50/50 and had been acquired with
the partners’ joint funds. RDPs in California should consider owning all joint property as
community property because under California income tax rules, the property will receive
a double step-up in basis at death. On the other hand, since this is transmuted from separate into community, it may be more difficult to argue that section 2040 does not apply.
e.	
Partnership. Regardless of state property law and whether or not the state recognizes same-sex couples, any unmarried couple can form a partnership. As a general rule, the partnership has to have
some profit-making potential. Merely owning a home together and sharing living expenses is not
enough to form a partnership for tax purposes. See Treas. Reg. §301.7701-1(a)(2).
		i.
However, if the parties own property that they manage or if they run a business together and
that business includes assets, forming a partnership (or an LLC) to own the properties may create some tax advantages. Not only will the entity provide a vehicle for joint management of the
property (assuming joint management is desired), the transfer into the entity of assets that would
otherwise be owned outright creates a significant devaluation in the value of the transferor’s estate.
This is because assets that are subject to the typical restrictions found in partnership agreements
are worth much less than even the discounted value of an undivided interest as a tenant in common. One simply cannot sell a 50 percent limited partnership interest for anything close to 50 percent of the value of the assets in the partnership. Because of the steep valuation discounts available
(sometimes close to 50 percent), family limited partnerships (or LLCs) have become prime estate
planning gimmicks.
		ii. There has been much litigation in the past few years over the role of family limited liability
enterprises (FLLEs) in estate planning. For a good discussion of the key cases, see Walter D. Schwidetzky, Family Limited Partnerships: The Beat Goes On, 60 Tax Law. 277 (2007).
		iii. Example: Wealthy Partner (WP) owns several rental properties with a value in excess of $8
million. Less Wealthy Partner (LWP) has some cash or other liquid assets and is good at keeping
the books on the rental properties. They form a limited partnership by contributing cash and the
properties to the entity and receiving interests that are proportionate to their contributions. LWP
has a 1 percent general partnership interest and WP has a 99 percent limited partnership interest.
The assets in the partnership are the $8 million worth of real estate and approximately $80,000
in cash. The 99 percent limited partnership interest in WP’s hands is instantly worth substantially
less than $8 million due to discounts for lack of marketability and lack of control. If WP wishes to
make lifetime gifts of the limited partnership interests, they will be valued at the discounted value.
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If WP holds onto the interest until death and then transfers the interest to LWP, it will be valued at
the discounted value. Discounts of 35 percent are typical. See 60 Tax Lawyer at 278. In this situation, merely creating the partnership could reduce the estate of WP by almost $3 million.
		iv. As long as there is a business purpose for the creation of the entity, the arrangement should be
respected for gift and estate tax purposes. However, abusive use of these arrangements has created
some troubling precedent, especially if the partnership assets do not consist of property that needs
management, such as marketable securities. Also, FLPs or FLLEs that are created shortly before
death are at high risk of audit.
		v. Most litigated cases involve partnerships formed by parents as a vehicle for passing wealth to
the next generation, but there is nothing to prevent the arguments made by the IRS in those cases
from being applied to a partnership created by a same-sex couple. There are two potential risks if
the entity is not formed correctly and if the only motive for creating the entity is to reduce taxes.
			(1) The Section 2036 Problem. Section 2036 has been successfully applied by the IRS to erase
the estate tax savings potential of these arrangements if under the arrangement the transferor
(usually the parent) has retained the right to income or enjoyment of the property. When
successful, the IRS has been able to show that there was an understanding among the parties (parents and children) that the transferor could withdraw assets from the partnership if
needed or continue to live in the home (when that was transferred to the partnership). One
key fact in the cases that find section 2036 applicable is the fact that the parent did not retain
sufficient assets to support him- or herself, in which case naturally the partnership assets would
be expected to be available as needed. See, e.g., Estate of Strangi v. Comm’r, 417 F.3d 468 (5th Cir.
2005); Estate of Thompson v. Comm’r, 382 F.3d 367 (3d Cir. 2004); Estate of Bigelow v. Comm’r, 503
F.3d 955 (9th Cir. 2007).
				(A) If section 2036 is applicable, the transfer of the assets will be ignored and the value
of the assets (rather than the discounted value of the partnership interest) will be included
in the estate at death. Of course, section 2036 does not apply to a transfer that qualifies as
a “bona fide sale for an adequate and full consideration.” These transfers at the creation
of the partnership interest are not gifts. They are transfers in exchange for a partnership
interest. Though the IRS has argued that a transfer of assets for a partnership interest
that is discounted for lack of marketability and control can never be a bona fide sale for
adequate consideration, the courts have not been willing to adopt such a per se rule. Nor
have they been willing to adopt the taxpayer argument that the receipt of a proportionate
partnership interest is, in every case, adequate and full consideration. The Tax Court and
at least three courts of appeal have stated that, in addition to the proportionate interest,
the transfer into the partnership must create some intangible benefit such as a “genuine
pooling of assets” and not just a change in form of ownership. See, especially, Estate of
Bigelow, 503 F.3d at 969. Bills have been regularly introduced in Congress to repeal the
valuation and lack-of-control discounts for any transfer of nonbusiness assets. But none
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of these provisions made it into the most recent tax law, which re-established the estate
tax with a $5 million exemption level.
			(2) Indirect Taxable Gifts. Form must be followed carefully. In our example, WP must clearly
transfer assets to the partnership well before gifting any interest in the partnership to LWP.
Also, the assets must be transferred in exchange for the partnership interest, and an appropriate capital account must be created. If WP gifts property to the partnership, she is indirectly
benefitting LWP and the IRS will classify the transfer of assets as an indirect taxable gift of
assets to LWP. Since the gift is of “assets” rather than of a partnership interest, no discounts
would be available. See Shepherd v. Comm’r, 283 F.3d 1258 (11th Cir. 2002). If the transfer of
assets and the gift of the partnership interest occur too close in time, the IRS may argue that
under the step transaction doctrine, the effect is really an indirect gift of assets rather than
of partnership interest. If the gift is characterized as a gift of assets, the extra valuation discounts will be lost (although a smaller fractional share discount should still be available as WP
is indirectly transferring an undivided interest in the property). The IRS has lost a series of
recent cases in which it pushed the step transaction doctrine. See, e.g., Gross v. Comm’r, 2008 WL
4388277 (U.S. Tax Ct. Sept. 29, 2008), and cases cited therein.
f. Revocable Trust—Advantages. Putting property in a revocable trust creates a number of advantages.
		i.
Avoiding probate. Because the trust holds title to the property there is no need for the property
to go through probate.
		ii. Unlike the creation of a joint tenancy or tenancy in common, there is no taxable gift upon
transfer to a revocable trust.
		

iii.

Flexibility. Trusts are generally easier to amend than wills.

		iv. Avoids the simultaneous death problem of joint tenancies. If one joint tenant survives the
other for a short period of time, the surviving joint tenant will wind up with all of the property,
which may then pass to that survivor’s heirs or beneficiaries to the exclusion of the family of the
first joint tenant.
		v. If the partners serve as co-trustees, or are named as successor trustees, the trust serves as a
vehicle to manage property during disability.
		

vi.

Privacy. Most trusts are not a matter of public record.

		vii. Protection against will contests. Although a revocable trust can be challenged on grounds of
undue influence, duress, or fraud, the fact that the trust arrangement was a completed transfer of
property at the time it was created and funded makes it a bit more difficult to challenge. If a chal-
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lenge seems imminent, it probably makes sense to use a trust department or some other independent trustee.
g. Revocable Trust—Tax Issues
		i.
No completed gift upon formation even though the transferor’s partner is named as a beneficiary. However, if distributions from the trust are made to the partner rather than to the transferor,
that payment could trigger gift tax liability if it exceeds the annual exclusion ($13,000 in 2011) and
if the transferor has exceeded the $1 million lifetime exclusion. Payments in discharge of a legal
obligation of support of the partner should not create taxable gifts.
		ii. Transferor continues to report income and deductions. No fiduciary return needs to be filed
for a grantor trust.
		iii. At the transferor’s death, 100 percent of the trust assets are included in the estate for estate tax
purposes.
		iv. If the trust is funded with community property, the trust document should provide that the
property remains community property even though it is held in trust. For California RDPs this will
protect the double step up in basis at the death of the first partner. This benefit is only available for
state income tax purposes.
h. Irrevocable Trusts
		i.
QPRTs And GRITs. A Qualified Personal Residence Trust and a Grantor Retained Income
Trust are two ways to transfer property from one partner to another at a gift tax savings. Example:
Partner A transfers in trust a $4 million vacation home to Partner B but retains a beneficial interest
in the trust for 10 years. The value of the gift is discounted to account for the fact that the transfer
is of a future interest, which is worth less than $4 million. The transfer also freezes the value of the
property for transfer tax purposes. If the transferor survives the 10-year term, the asset will not be
included in the estate. If the transferor fails to survive, the vacation home will be taxed at date of
death value, which is the same result as not making the transfer in the first place. If the asset escapes
estate tax it will not receive a step up in basis at death. (Note: For opposite-sex married couples the
only type of GRIT allowed is a QPRT.)
		ii. GRATs And GRUTs. Grantor Retained Annuity Trusts and Grantor Retained Unitrusts are
arrangements similar to GRITs, although the transferor might provide for the retained interest in
these sorts of trusts that is much larger over a shorter period of time—for example, a transfer of
$100,000 worth of stock with a three-year retained interest of $30,000 a year, or 30 percent of
the stock per year. This works well if the stock is expected to appreciate rapidly over the next three
years. The gift will be discounted to present value of the $10,000 (or 10 percent) remainder interest
for gift tax purposes, and at the end of the three-year term, if the stock has appreciated, the donee
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will benefit from ownership of the appreciated value at no gift tax cost. If the stock were to double
in value, the donee would have $20,000 in value for the cost of a gift tax on less than $10,000.
		iii. ILIT (Irrevocable Life Insurance Trust). Life insurance is a good way to plan for paying estate
taxes when the wealthy partner dies. Since there is no marital deduction, the estate tax cannot be
avoided if the estate exceeds the credit shelter amount ($5 million as of 2011). As long as someone
other than the insured is the owner of the policy, the proceeds will not be included in the taxable
estate. One option is for the partners to own policies on each other’s lives (assuming you have two
taxable estates). But when a partner dies, the value of the policy owned by that partner (cash surrender value) will be included in the estate of that partner. You also have to worry about where the
policy goes at that partner’s death. Does it go back to the insured? If so, you will not avoid inclusion
in the insured’s estate. For some clients this is not really an issue if the policy is a term policy (virtually no value) and the only reason for taking out the insurance was to cover estate taxes on the first
to die. But if the intent is to keep the policy in force, it would be better to have the policy owned
by an irrevocable trust. Trusts don’t die. If the insured is funding the trust to pay for the premiums,
there may be taxable gift issues since the transfer to the trust is not a present interest. The best way
to avoid the current gift tax is to create a Crummey power—a right of withdrawal—in the other
partner. The right to withdraw a sum from the trust creates a present interest and will qualify for
the $13,000 annual exclusion.
		iv. IDGTs. The point of an intentionally defective grantor trust is for the transferor to retain a
power over the trust to make it a grantor trust, but not a power that would include the trust in the
transferor’s estate. One possibility is to retain a nonfiduciary power to substitute assets. This makes
the trust a grantor trust under section 675(4)(C). But the power does not cause the trust assets to
be included in the grantor’s estate. See Rev. Rul. 2008-2, 2008-1 C.B. 796. The full value of the
trust assets is gifted to the partner as a beneficiary of the trust, including the trust income. But the
grantor pays the income tax on the trust income. And payment of tax on income that is distributed
to the partner is not an additional gift to the partner because the income is treated as income of the
grantor under the grantor trust rules.
		v. CRATs And CRUTs. These are charitable remainder trusts (CRTs). In a charitable remainder
annuity trust (CRAT), the retained income interest is expressed in terms of a fixed amount or
annuity. A charitable remainder unitrust (CRUT) expresses the income as a fixed percentage of
the value of the trust assets, valued annually. Because the return will increase as the value of the
assets increases, the CRUT is used as a vehicle to keep up with inflation. There are restrictions on
the size of the retained income interest to ensure that the remainder interest to charity will not be
eradicated by contingent withdrawals for named beneficiaries, etc. CRTs can be set up during the
donor’s lifetime if an income tax deduction is desirable, or they can be created at death with the
income interest assigned to the partner. The trust will produce a charitable deduction to the estate,
which is of interest to couples who do not have access to a marital deduction.
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D.	Specific Tax Issues For Same-Sex Married Couples, Registered Domestic Partners, And
Parties To A Civil Union: More Detailed Discussion
1.

Income Tax Issues
a.	
Property Divisions At “Divorce.” Divisions of property at “divorce” may be taxable under U.S. v. Davis,
370 U.S. 65 (1962). Section 1041 of the IRC provides that spousal transfers, during marriage or
incident to divorce, are not taxable. By its terms the provision only applies to spouses and not to
RDPs. Under DOMA, the provision only applies to opposite-sex spouses. Before the enactment of
section 1041 in 1984, transfers of appreciated property at divorce often created taxable exchanges
under the reasoning of U.S. v. Davis (holding Mr. Davis taxable on the gain recognized when he
transferred appreciated stock in exchange for Mrs. Davis’s release of her marital rights). Between
1962 and 1984, however, a number of courts ruled that property divisions incident to divorce were
not always taxable. To avoid tax under the Davis rule, the spouses both had to have ownership interests in the marital property. This ownership was easy to establish for community property spouses.
Early, pre-Davis case law had established that equal divisions of community property at divorce
were not taxable events. See Walz v. Comm’r, 32 B.T.A. 718 (1935). See also Carrieres v. Comm’r, 64 T.C.
959 (1975), acq. in result, 1976-2 C.B. 1, aff ’d per curiam, 552 F.2d 1350 (9th Cir. 1977) (nontaxable division of community property, but gain recognized to extent separate property was exchanged for
community interest); Rev. Rul. 76-83, 1976-1 C.B. 213 (citing additional cases in accord). In common law property states, wives who were not on the deed were sometimes found to have a sufficient
equitable interest in the marital property to apply the tax rules applicable to community property
spouses. See Imel v. United States, 375 F. Supp. 1102 (D. Colo. 1973), aff ’d, 523 F.2d 853 (10th Cir.
1975) (split of marital property under equitable division rules is a nontaxable division of jointly
owned property provided wife has sufficiently vested interest); Collins v. Comm’r, 412 F.2d 211 (10th
Cir. 1969) (applying Oklahoma law and holding division of marital property non-taxable after U.S.
Supreme Court remanded for decision in keeping with property rights announced by Oklahoma
Supreme Court). In a related case, it was determined that when the wife later sold the stock she had
a gain calculated on the stock’s carryover basis. But see U.S. v. Wallace, 439 F.2d 757 (8th Cir. 1971),
cert. denied, 404 U.S. 831 (1971) (applying Iowa law and finding wife was not sufficiently vested in
property; husband recognized gain under the Davis rule).

		i.
Ultimately the IRS agreed with the courts. See Rev. Rul. 81-292, 1981-2 C.B. 158 (“An approximately equal division of the total value of jointly owned property in a state that is not a community property state, under a divorce settlement agreement that provides for transferring some
assets in their entirety to one spouse or the other, is a non-taxable division and does not result in
the realization of gain or loss.”) The legal argument is that there is no realization when two partners
make an equal division of their jointly owned property. The same argument can be used to support
non-realization in property divisions between same-sex spouses and registered domestic partners.
		ii. See also GCM 37716. This is an internal memorandum from the Chief Counsel, IRS, addressing the questions finally resolved in Revenue Ruling 81-292. The memo offers its rationale for
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treating married couples differently from unrelated individuals. Observation: Unmarried cohabitants
at “divorce” are more similar to married couples than to unrelated individuals. See especially footnote
2 of GCM 37716 (making the distinction between property divisions incident to the dissolution of
a relationship and ad hoc property divisions between unrelated individuals).
		iii. Conclusion: Even though section 1041 cannot apply to same-sex spouses or partners, a property division is not necessarily a taxable event under U.S. v. Davis, supra. The transfer of appreciated property can be characterized as a tax-free division of jointly owned property if there are
sufficiently vested ownership interests for both spouses. This characterization is not limited to community property states. Couples in equitable division states may be able to rely on pre-§1041 cases
from common law states provided that the partners can be characterized as co-owners. In some
cases, even though title was held in the name of the husband, the wife’s interests were found to be
sufficiently vested to avoid the U.S. v. Davis characterization. Cases include Imel, supra (Colorado
law); Collins, supra (Oklahoma law); and McIntosh v. Comm’r, 85 T.C. 31 (1985) (Montana law). But
if the state’s equitable division statutes give the judge too much discretion in dividing the property,
the spouses will not be considered co-owners. See Wiles v. Comm’r, 499 F.2d 255 (10th Cir.), cert. denied,
419 U.S. 996 (1974) (Kansas law). Instead, the transferor will be treated the same as Mr. Davis and
taxed on any appreciation in the property transferred.
		

iv.

Revenue Ruling 81-292 concluded as follows:

		
An approximately equal division of the total value of jointly owned property in a state that is not a community property state, under a divorce settlement agreement that provides for transferring some assets in their entirety to one spouse
or the other, is a non-taxable division and does not result in the realization of gain or loss.

		That is, the ruling itself was not limited to community property. This ruling has never been revoked.
		v. Although DOMA prevents direct application of this ruling (because it mentions spouses), the
reasoning in the ruling seems correct and stands for the principle that when a couple is dissolving
a relationship and distributing out the jointly owned property, the fact that the distributions are not
pro rata does not affect the underlying tax characterization as a non-realization event.
		vi. See also Reynolds v. Comm’r, 1999 WL 109618 (U.S. Tax Ct. Mar. 4, 1999) (cash payments in
settlement of cohabitant’s claim to property acquired during the relationship; IRS argued payment
for services, taxpayer argued excludable gifts under section 102; court held that the payments were
for property and did not exceed claimant’s basis). The court held that the non-titled partner had an
equitable interest in the property, which she was exchanging for cash. Under this characterization
of the transaction, had the partners merely divided the property equally, presumably the transaction would have been a non-taxable division of property. Instead, because she received cash payments, the transaction was treated as a sale. The court held that she recognized no gain because
there was no evidence that her basis in the property interest was less than the amount realized.
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		vii. U.S. v. Davis, supra, focused only on the income tax consequences to Mr. Davis. Some years later, the IRS issued a revenue ruling that covers spouses such as Mrs. Davis. Rev. Rul. 67-221, 1967-2
C.B. 63, held that when a wife receives property at divorce in exchange for her dower rights, she
has no income and takes a basis equal to fair market value. (See also footnote 7 in the Davis case,
noting that the IRS administrative practice was to treat the wife’s receipt of property at divorce as
nontaxable.) The ruling contains no rationale or justification for the conclusion it reaches, but it is
commonly understood to be the right result under the “in lieu of ” theory. Similarly, if a same-sex
spouse or partner receives cash or property at “divorce” in exchange for marital rights like support
and dower, the receipt of the cash or property should not be taxable income since it is “in lieu of ”
items the partner would have been entitled to enjoy tax free.
		viii. Query whether a Davis-type transfer is subject to tax under the gift tax rules. Just because it is
not a gift under the income tax rules does not mean that it is also not a gift under the gift tax rules.
The definitions of “gift” under the two taxes are different. For income tax, the transferor’s motive
is key. For the gift tax, the rule is that the transfer is a gift unless the transferor received “adequate
consideration in money or money’s worth.” Section 2516 answers the gift question for spouses by
providing that if the transfer is made in settlement of support rights or marital or property rights,
there is adequate consideration. With DOMA on the books, this provision probably cannot apply
to same-sex couples. If the statute merely codifies existing “common law” of taxation, however,
one can argue that a similar rule applies to registered or married same-sex partners. At least to the
extent that the transfer is in settlement of support rights, there is a strong argument that there is no
taxable gift. Satisfaction of support obligations, as long as those obligations are imposed by state
law, should not constitute a taxable gift. See D.2.g below.
b.	
Alimony Or Support Payments. Alimony payments will not be covered by sections 71 and 215. These
provisions allow spouses to shift the income tax burden on alimony payments by including the
payment in the income of the payee spouse and awarding a deduction to the payor spouse. At the
federal level, the only way to shift the tax burden on alimony payments is to comply with sections
71 and 215, which are explicitly available only to spouses. At the state level (California, Massachusetts, and similar states), alimony income can be shifted on the state income tax return.
		i.
It is not clear how alimony payments between same-sex spouses and partners will be taxed at
the federal level. One possibility is to rely on Gould v. Gould, 245 U.S. 151 (1917), for the proposition
that the payments are not income to the recipient. It has been informally suggested that Gould is no
longer good law because it was decided at a time when income was thought to consist only of salary
and rentals and similar recurring items. Comm’r v. Glenshaw Glass Co., 348 U.S. 426 (1955), is thought
to have changed this notion of income for good. However, Gould can also be characterized as a case
in which the payment was received in lieu of ongoing spousal support, which is itself nontaxable.
The “in lieu of ” doctrine supports the notion that damages received “in lieu of ” something that
would have been excluded from income should similarly be excluded from income. See Lyeth v. Hoey,
305 U.S. 188 (1938) (damages received in settlement of will contest suit held nontaxable because
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they were received in lieu of a bequest or inheritance that would have been nontaxable under section 102).
		ii. See also GCM 37571, 1978 WL 43529, holding that support payments included in an exwife’s income under section 71 continue to be included under section 61 when they are made
beyond the period that the ex-husband was legally responsible. One interpretation of this GCM
could be that support payments are taxable to the recipient, either under section 71 or section 61.
However, the IRS specifically rejected that broad rule in the GCM, and reaffirmed the basic principle in Gould, stating:
		
If payments are made by the husband in satisfaction of a valid support obligation, we believe the holding of Gould v.
Gould would bar the includibility of these payments in the wife’s gross income, unless they were specifically included
in her income under section 71. While Congress, by enacting section 71 and its predecessor, section 22(k) of the 1939
Code, intended to overrule the holding of Gould in the circumstances described in those sections, it showed no intention
of rendering this holding inapplicable to a situation which was not so specifically described. Moreover, contemporary
decisions have recognized the continued viability of Gould in situations not covered under section 71. See, e.g. Taylor v
Comm’r, 55 T.C. 1134, 1138 (1971).

		In other words, the payments in the GCM were not alimony because the husband was no longer
under an obligation to continue the support payments. They were more like a windfall and thus
taxable under section 61. If they had been true alimony, they would have been excluded under
Gould.
2.

Estate And Gift Tax Issues
a.	
No Marital Deduction. There is no marital deduction for same-sex couples. Thus, there is no way to
avoid the federal estate tax at the death of the first to die. For wealthy same-sex couples, the only
possible estate tax saving is to avoid the tax on the death of the second partner by creating a bypass
trust.

		i.
Note: As a general rule, this means that formula funding clauses used to fund marital share
and bypass/credit shelter trusts for married couples have no meaning for same-sex couples. As a
result, you cannot use standard forms to draft residuary trusts for same-sex couples. There is no
point in limiting the funding of a credit shelter trust to the exemption amount because the excess
will not qualify for a marital deduction. It might make more sense to put 100 percent in the credit
shelter trust.
		ii. On the other hand, a funding formula tied to the unused GST exemption to fund a bypass
trust that qualifies as GST exempt would make sense. The question is what to do with the rest of
the property. If the aim is to avoid taxes upon the second death and the survivor has property of
his or her own equal to the exemption amount, everything should be in a bypass trust. If taxes are
not a major concern and the desire is to provide as much as possible to the surviving partner, an
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outright gift or a gift in trust with a general power of appointment or right to revoke may make
sense.
b.	
Potential Problem With Use Of Disclaimer Trusts. One planning opportunity for spouses is to leave the
estate outright to the surviving spouse, but if he or she disclaims, in whole or in part, to direct that
the disclaimed property will fund a bypass trust that benefits the surviving spouse during lifetime
but is not taxed at the surviving spouse’s death. The allows the couple to do some postmortem
estate planning by deciding whether it is better for the surviving spouse to take outright and utilize
the marital deduction or for the surviving spouse to save taxes at her or his subsequent death, in
effect by electing to take under the bypass trust and forgo the marital deduction.
		i.
Same-sex couples who want the same flexibility—that is, for the survivor to be able to decide
whether to take outright or in trust for tax savings at the second death (there is no marital deduction to enter the equation here)—run into a problem with the language in section 2518. Section
2518(b)(4) provides that to be a qualified disclaimer, the property must pass either to the spouse of
the decedent or to a person other than the person making the disclaimer. Even though the property
passes under the terms of the decedent’s will to a bypass trust, and through no direction on behalf
of the disclaiming partner, the fact that the disclaimant has an interest in the bypass trust means
that the requirements of subsection (b)(4) are not met.
c.	
Contingent Marital Deduction Planning. If the primary estate plan is to avoid taxes upon the death of
the second partner, everything should be left in a bypass trust. At this point, however, the planner should ask: What if DOMA is repealed by the time this couple dies and their relationship is
recognized by the IRS? If the plan has left everything in a bypass trust, that transfer likely will not
qualify for the marital deduction that would otherwise be available. Solution: Use the normal funding clauses to fund a credit-shelter trust (the trust can also be GST exempt) and leave everything
else to a separate bypass trust that can qualify as a QTIP—that is, all income must be paid to the
survivor and no one else can have an interest in the trust assets during the survivor’s lifetime. That
means there can be no special powers to appoint corpus or income to anyone other than surviving
spouse. Then, if the marital deduction is available, the QTIP election can be made for that trust.
You might also provide that if the QTIP election is not made, the assets will instead pass to the
credit shelter trust. See Est. of Clayton v. Comm’r, 976 F.2d 1486 (5th Cir. 1992).
		i.
Some planners are considering naming a trust protector and giving the trust protector the
power to rewrite any provisions in the trust that may need to be rewritten to qualify a trust for the
marital deduction. Under this approach, you could create a discretionary income bypass trust and
charge the trust protector with dividing the trust into a discretionary bypass trust and a marital
deduction trust by amending the terms that apply to the marital deduction trust so that it will meet
IRC requirements (for example, mandatory income payout and no power to appoint to anyone
other than spouse/partner). Issues include:
			

(1) Who will be the trust protector? The attorney who drafts the estate plan?
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(2) What is the potential liability of the trust protector?

d.	Same Sex Couples In Recognition States With Decoupled Estate Taxes. A number of states that recognize
same-sex couples (married or domestic partners or civil unions) have separate state estate taxes that
are decoupled from the federal estate tax, meaning their exemption amounts are lower than the $5
million federal exemption. New Jersey, for example, has an estate tax with a $675,000 exemption.
(See also Connecticut, Massachusetts, Washington, and other states.) Same-sex couples subject to
possible estate taxes in these states ought to at least consider marital deduction planning to avoid
the state estate taxes.
e.	
Life Insurance. If the couple has significant estate tax liability and insufficient liquidity, life insurance
is the best way to meet the liability. It may be worth checking with life insurance professionals to see
if purchasing a first-to-die policy would save on the overall cost of life insurance since the liability
arises on the death of the first to die.
		i.
It is also important to keep the life insurance policy out of the estate of the first to die. If the
policy covers both partners, neither of them should be the owner of the policy. Instead, the policy
should be owned by an irrevocable life insurance trust. The estate can then borrow the funds from
the trust to pay the estate taxes when the life insurance pays out.
		ii. One other point about life insurance: Often one partner will own a simple term policy on the
life of the other partner. In California, Washington, and Nevada, if the policy is to be owned by
the uninsured partner, the premium payments should come from the uninsured partner’s separate
property to avoid having the policy classified as community property. If the policy is a community
asset, 50 percent of the proceeds would be included in the estate of the insured. If there is no separate property, community property should be transmuted into separate property for this purpose.
		iii. If a partner has significant life insurance through an employer insurance plan, it is worth
checking with the employer to see if it is possible to transfer ownership to someone other than the
employee. Many people assume that such transfers are not possible with respect to group plans, but
that is not necessarily true. And in the community property states of California, Washington, and
Nevada, any such group insurance is likely to be community property so that only half goes into
the estate of the insured if he or she is the first to die.
f.	
Use Of Joint Trusts. In some states, planners regularly use inter vivos revocable trusts to avoid probate. To wholly avoid probate, that means all assets (or as many as possible) must be transferred into
the trusts. For same-sex couples who have pooled all their assets, a question often arises whether to
use separate trusts or a single joint trust. Use of a joint trust raises possible gift tax issues. If the joint
trust is drafted correctly, A can contribute A’s separate property to the trust and B can contribute
B’s separate property to the trust. If any of this property is income-producing, the income should
be allocated out to the owner of the underlying property to avoid potential gifts between A and B.
Both A and B should have an independent power to revoke the joint trust, and upon revocation A’s
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property should vest in A and B’s property should vest in B. At the death of the first partner, that
partner’s share of the trust should be included in his or her estate. The survivor’s share should remain subject to a power to revoke—that is, it should not become irrevocable—to avoid any possible
lifetime gift to the ultimate beneficiaries under the trust. At this point, the question becomes: what
is the benefit of having a joint trust?
		i.
If the assets have to be kept segregated to avoid unintentional gifts from one partner to the
other, there really is no gain from having a single trust as opposed to two separate trusts. Husbands
and wives do not have to worry about unintentional gifts between spouses because they generally qualify for the 100 percent marital deduction. In any event, many estate planners, even for
husbands and wives, believe that separate trusts are safer and easier to manage. It is clear whose
property is whose. I concur in the advice that use of separate rather than joint trusts is preferable.
		ii. But what about couples in California, Washington, and Nevada who own community property? California attorneys in particular use revocable trusts to avoid probate. Even those who advise
separate trusts for each partner are reconsidering whether a single joint trust for community property should be used. If the property is 100 percent pure community—that is, it was community
when acquired and has not been transmuted from separate to community—the two partners are
equally vested in the property and all the income from the property. I do not think there is a risk if
the trust contains only pure community property.
		iii. Thus, for clients in these three community property states who want to use revocable inter vivos trusts as part of their estate plans, the solution would be to have each partner create a separate
trust for separate property and have both create a third, joint trust for community property.
		iv. Then, at the death of the first partner, the assets in the separate trust would be included in
his or her estate, as would 50 percent of the assets in the joint trust. Where should the assets go at
the death of the first partner? That depends on the estate plan. If taxes are not a concern and the
desire is to benefit the surviving partner, at the death of the first partner the joint trust becomes a
survivor’s trust for the benefit of the surviving partner. The assets in the joint trust should continue
in that trust with full right of the surviving partner to revoke and use all assets as he or she may
request. And the assets in the separate trust should pass to the survivor’s trust. For joint estates under $5 million (assuming the $5 million exemption continues), this plan is simple and causes no tax
disadvantages.
		v. For couples bumping up against the estate tax exemption amount, upon death of the first
partner, that partner’s share of the joint trust and separate property trust should be subject to a disposition provision that gives an amount to the survivor that, when added to his or her own property
at that time, does not exceed $5 million. The remainder should be included in a bypass trust for the
benefit of the survivor for life and then for the children or whoever the intended beneficiaries are
after the death of the second partner.

Planning For Same-Sex Couples | 33

		vi. Practice Point: Do not combine community and separate property in a single trust. The tax
consequences of doing this for partners who cannot rely on the marital deduction are unknown.
Although it is possible to draft in detail to allocate ownership of the property between the two
partners for purposes of revocation and transfer at death, it is probably simpler to put the property
into separate trusts. And community and separate property need to be separately identified for
purposes of basis step-up at death under state income tax law (California’s, for example).
g. P
 ayments Of Support And The Gift Tax. When one taxpayer supports another out of the goodness of
his or her heart, any amount in excess of $13,000 per year can be classified as a taxable gift to the
person who is being supported. The general rule is that support payments that are not required
under state law constitute taxable gifts. See, e.g., Rev. Rul. 54-343, 1954-2 C.B. 318 (father’s payments of hospital bills and living expenses of son and son’s family held as taxable gifts); Rev. Rul.
82-98, 1982-1 C.B. 141 (parent support of adult disabled child held as taxable gifts). See Robert G.
Popovich, Support Your Family, but Leave Out Uncle Sam: A Call for Federal Gift Tax Reform, 55 Md. L. Rev.
343 (1996); but see Patricia A. Cain, Same-Sex Couples and the Federal Tax Laws, 1 Law & Sexuality 97
(1991) (arguing that support payments by one partner for the joint consumption of both partners
should not be viewed as taxable gifts because they are not transfers of property and such payments
do not constitute the sort of estate-depleting transfers that the gift tax was intended to cover). Now
that the gift tax has been retained despite potential repeal of the estate tax, the new justification for
the gift tax is to protect against income-shifting gifts. Joint consumption does not shift income and
so, similarly, such payments are not the sort of transactions that the gift tax is intended to cover.
		i.
On the other hand, when support obligations are imposed by state law, as they are for samesex married couples and RDPs and parties to a civil union, there should be no taxable gift to the
extent that payments during the relationship (or at “divorce”) can reasonably be characterized as
support payments.
			(1) There is no clear rule in the gift tax regulations saying that payments in satisfaction of
legal obligations of support are not taxable gifts. Such a regulation was proposed under the
1954 Code, but never adopted.
			(2) Transfers in satisfaction of a legal obligation of support do not constitute taxable gifts because they are made in exchange for consideration in money or money’s worth. See Rev. Rul.
68-379, 1968-2 C.B. 414 (H transfers property to W incident to a legal separation in exchange
for her release of her support rights; to the extent the property was for the release of support
rights, it did not constitute a taxable gift).
			(3) As early as 1946, the IRS took the position that a release of support rights constituted
valuable consideration in money or money’s worth, and thus the receipt of a sum in exchange
for such a release would not be a taxable gift. See E.T. 19, 1946-2 C.B. 166. This E.T. was
superseded by subsequent revenue rulings taking exactly the same position. See Rev. Rul. 60160, 1960-1 C.B. 374, Rev. Rul. 68-379, 1968-2 C.B. 414. The position taken in these revenue
rulings was required by the United States Supreme Court opinion in Harris v. Comm’r, 340 U.S.
106 (1950). That case, although it covered transfers between spouses, is still good law.
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			(4) Before Harris, there was an ongoing debate between the IRS and the Tax Court over
whether transfers incident to divorce could ever be taxable gifts. The Tax Court took the position that they could not, even if the transfer was for property rights (for example, dower) as
well as for support. The IRS, by contrast, continued to insist that property divisions might be
subject to gift tax even though transfers for support were never subject to the gift tax. After
the Harris decision, the Tax Court concluded that the IRS position was correct. See McMurtry
v. Comm’r, 203 F.2d 659 (1st Cir. 1953). The key point, however, is that both the IRS and the
courts have consistently taken the position that transfers in exchange for a release of support
rights can never be subject to the gift tax.
		

ii.

			

What constitutes support?
(1) Food, clothing, and shelter.

			(2) Something beyond the basic necessities. See Hill v. Comm’r, 88 F.2d 941, 945 (8th Cir
1937) (husband created trust to support wife and contribute to the maintenance of the home
as long as they lived together; the question was whether the income from the trust was taxable
to the husband because it discharged his legal obligation to support the wife; the court held
that the income was taxable to the husband. The cost of maintaining the home was $50,000
a year. This amount was above bare necessities, but the court said: “The maintenance, operation, and upkeep of a dwelling as a home for a man and his wife connote something more
than the mere food and shelter for the two spouses alone. It includes a place to which friends
and the children and other relatives of the man and his wife may come and visit and be socially entertained from time to time. So much inexorable custom would seem to dictate”).
			(3) There is very little law on the question of where support ends and a taxable gift begins.
See David Beck and Sheldon V. Ekman, When Does Support End and Taxable Gift Begin? 23 N.Y.U.
Ann. Inst. on Fed. Tax’n 1181 (1965).
			(4) There is more law on what constitutes support for purposes of the dependency exemption. Query whether the tests should be the same or at least similar.
				(A) Items of support are not limited to necessities. McKay v. Comm’r, 34 T.C. 1080 (1960)
(singing and drama lessons for minor child).
				(B) Support can include transfers of capital items like televisions and automobiles. See
Rev. Rul. 77-282, 1977-2 C.B. 52.
				(C) Support may include charitable contributions made by the dependent or spouse. See
Rev. Rul. 58-67, 1958-1 C.B. 62.
				(D) Support includes expenses for entertainment. See Muracca v. Comm’r, 1984 WL 14489
(U.S. Tax Ct. Apr. 30, 1984) (tickets to hockey games and country club expenses).
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